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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DIAMOND & PEGGY DIAMOND, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ROBERT E. CHRISTOFFERSON, RUTH R. 
CHRISTOFFERSON,husband and wife, 
and GLEN R. CHRISTOFFERSON, LAURA 
CHRISTOFFERSON, husband and wife, 
and the UNKNOWN WIVES, DEVICES, 
HEIRS AND CREDITORS OF THE ABOVE-
NAMED PARTIES AND ALL OTHER 
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO HAVE OR 
CLAIM TO HAVE ANY RIGHT, TITLE 
OR ESTATE, LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case NO. 16642 
PETITION OF APPELLANTS FOR RE-HEARING 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON RE-HEARING 
The appellants request that the Supreme Court decision 
filed on October 21, 1980, be vacated and that the Court 
reverse the findings of the district court and remand this 
matter back for trial and/or enter an order in favor of the 
appellants against the respondents. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court entered a decision on October 21, 
1980, adverse to the appellants. The appellants now·seek 
to have a re-hearing of that decision because: 1) the 
Supreme Court overlooked one of the major issues raised by 
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the appellants on appeal. The appellants contended that 
the trial court committed error when it ruled that the 
quantum of proof to establish a right-of-way was by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The Supreme Court did not deal with 
this issue. 2) The Supreme Court, in ruling on the issue 
of whether or not the right-of-way had been abandoned, 
made a mistake as to the facts which were established at 
the time of the trial hearing. In addition, the Court 
required the appellants to show specific intent to establish 
abandonment of the right-of-way but did not require the 
same standard of proof of the respondents in establishing 
the right-of-way. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER OR RULE ON THE ISSUE 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAD APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD 
OF PROOF REQUIRING ONLY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
INSTEAD OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
At the trial in the lower court, the appellants con-
ceded that a right-of-way existed that was approximately 
twenty-one (21) feet wide. This was based upon the fact 
that a survey had been conducted approximately twenty (20) 
years earlier that indicated the lane was nineteen (19) 
feet wide on one end and approximately twenty-one (21) feet 
2 
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wide on the opposite end. The appellants did not at any 
time agree that the right-of-way had ever been thirty-
three (33) feet wide. The burden was upon the respondents 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence any width they 
claimed in excess of twenty-one (21) feet. Judge Gould, 
in his Memorandum Decision, stated that the respondents 
were only required to demonstrate ,~.a preponderance of 
the evidence that their easement was thirty-three (33) 
feet wide. The Judge went on to state in part as follows: 
A true application of the rule of pre-
ponderance evidence in a civil case is a 
simple proposition is the fact alleged 
more probably true than not true ••• 
This court, on numerous cases, has indicated that the 
burden that must be born by a person claiming a right-of-
way is that of proof by clear and convincing evidence. In 
fact, the Supreme Court, in the decision issued on October 21, 
1980, applied that burden to the appellants when it ruled 
that the appellants had to meet that burden in order to 
demonstrate the right-of-way had been abandoned. It is 
inconceivable to believe that this court could allow the 
respondents to establish their case on the basis of a pre-
ponderance of the evidence but require that the appellants 
meet the burden of clear and convincing evidence. 
This Court, in Peterson vs. Combe, 20 U.2d 376, 
438 P.2d 545 (1968), held that a party claiming that a road 
was public had to bear the burden of proving by clear and 
3 
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convincing evidence that constitutionally must be justified, 
The Court went on to state that a mere preponderance of 
the evidence was not sufficient to show clear and convincing 
evidence. This court has ruled in a similar manner in the 
cases of Buckley vs. Cox, 247 P.2d 277, 122 Utah 151, and 
in Western Gateway Storage Company vs. Treseder, 56 7 P. 2d 181 
(1977). A similar decision was reached in the case of 
Harmon vs. Rasmussen, 12 Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962). 
This case was cited by the Supreme Court in its decision of 
October 21, 1980, in footnote No. 3, as supporting the fact 
that clear and convincing evidence was the quantum of proof 
that was required in this type of case. 
As the record presently stands before this court, the 
district court judge determined that the right-of-way which 
is at issue was not proven by clear and convincing evidence 
but merely by a preponderance of the evidence. Since the 
quantum of proof required by this court was not met in the 
lower court, the court's decision must be reversed or the 
matter must be referred to the trial court for a re-trial 
to determine whether or not the respondents are able to 
present evidence which meets the quantum of proof of 
clear and convincing evidence. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS AND 
APPLICATION OF T~E LAW AS IT APPLIES TO ITS OCTOBER 21, 
1980 DECISION. 
4 
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The decision reached by this court on October 21, 
1980, stated in two places that during the last twenty 
(20) years the appellants had constructed fences and 
taken other actions which narrowed the roadway. This is 
not supported by the evidence. The evidence presented at 
the trial court demonstrated that a survey was taken by a 
qualified engineer in 1957, twenty-two (22) years before the 
difficulties arose between the appellants and the respondents. 
That survey demonstrated that the lane was nineteen (19) 
feet wide on the east and twenty-one and one-half (21-1/2) 
feet wide on the west. (R.132, lines 7 through 19, R.134, 
lines 20 through 23) The appellants introduced into evidence 
aerial photographs marked as Exhibits "A" and "B" which 
demonstrate that in 1958, twenty-one (21) years before the 
difficulties arose between the appellants and repondents, 
trees were in location on both sides of the lane which 
restricted the width of the lane from twenty (20) to 
twenty-two (22) feet. (R.136, line 20 through R.137, 
line 6) The engineer who made the survey testified that 
he has been familiar with the lane since he made the original 
survey in 1957 and that the width of the fences has not 
changed during that twenty-two (22) year period. (R.135, 
lines 16 through 18, R.145, lines 8 through 11) There was 
no evidence produced at the trial court which demonstrated 
5 
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that the appellants or anyone owning the property prior 
to them had moved fenceposts or any other structures with-
in the twenty-one (21) to twenty-two (22) foot width that 
was established in 1957. However, this court made such a 
determination in paragraphs 2, 8 and 9 of its decision. 
Consequently, the facts upon which this court based its 
October 21, 1980, decision were inaccurate and without 
foundation in the trial court records. 
It is the contention of the appellants that the quantum 
of proof for an abandonment of a right-of-way should not be 
any greater than the proof required for the establishment 
of a right-of-way. The intent necessary to establish 
the right-of-way is generally demonstrated by the fact that 
a person uses a right-of-way without specific objections on 
the part of the person owning the fee for a period of twenty 
(20) years. Consequently, it is the appellants' contention 
that the abandonment of a right-of-way, likewise, can be 
demonstrated by the fact that a right-of-way is restricted 
without any objection being made to that restriction for a 
twenty-year (20) period of time. To hold otherwise would be 
manifestly unfair to all parties involved. 
This court, in Richard vs. Pine View Ranch, Inc., 
559 P.2d 948 (1977), stated that "if a twenty year adverse 
use was established, then that could only be defeated by a 
prohibition of use for a like period". The Utah Supreme 
6 
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Court has also held that when parties have slept upon 
their rights they will not be heard to complain after a 
period of twenty (20) years. In a boundary dispute issue 
in the case of King vs. Fronk, 15 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 1893 
(1963) this court held that where a boundary is allowed to 
exist for a long period of time without protest there is 
established an implied agreement based upon the passage of 
time. These cases clearly indicate that intent is mani-
fested by a failure to act over a passage of time. Similar 
decisions have been reached in other states. A California 
Appellate Court, in Hansen vs. Daniel, 289 P.2d 50 (Cal. App.), 
stated that an easement may be extinguished by non-use and 
abandonment.by a use adverse to the easement for a period 
equalling the time required to establish the easement. A 
Nevada court, in the case of Brooks vs. Jensen, 483 P.2d 650, 
held that an easement can be abandoned and that non-use of 
the easement is evidence of such intent. Clearly in this 
case, the respondents failed to object to the approximately 
twenty-one (21) foot width for a period of approximately 
twenty-two (22) years. No greater proof of intent was 
required of the respondents or produced by them in 
attempting to establish an original easement of thirty-three 
(33) feet. 
7 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court applied the wrong quantum of proof 
when in ruled that the respondents only had to demonstrate 
existence of a thirty-three (33) foot right-of-way by a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The Supreme Court incorrectly assumed 
that the appellants had narrowed the right-of-way since the 
survey was conducted in 1957. In fact, the right-of-way 
was not narrowed during this period of time but was used 
actively at the twenty-one (21) foot width for a period 
of twenty-two (22) years. This court's decision seemed to 
state that a right-of-way can be created merely from the 
use for a period of twenty (20) years without showing 
specific intent. However, an abandonment of a right-of-
way can only be demonstrated by showing specific intent 
to abandon. The appellants request that this court have 
a re-hearing in this matter and an order reversing the lower 
court's decision in favor of the appellants or remand this 
matter back for trial to the district court. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 1980. 
8 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT A. · ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Petition of Appellants for 
Re-Hearing to the attorney for the respondents, 
Richard Richards, Esq., at 2408 van Buren, Ogden, Utah 
84401, on this the day of November, 1980. 
JEANNINE C. DAMEWORTH 
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